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Amy Barrett* 
One of the most interesting developments in the 
constitutional theory of new originalism is its exploration of the 
distinction between interpretation and construction in 
constitutional law. Within this framework, “interpretation” 
refers to the process of determining a text’s linguistic meaning, 
and “construction” refers to the process of giving the text legal 
effect.1 The distinction plays out in the new originalist approach 
to the Constitution as follows. The defining characteristic of new 
originalism is its argument that the original public meaning of 
the Constitution’s text should control its interpretation.2 Yet new 
originalists do not contend that the Constitution’s original public 
meaning is capable of resolving every constitutional question.3 
The Constitution’s provisions are written at varying levels of 
generality. When the original public meaning of the text 
establishes a broad principle rather than a specific legal rule, 
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. 
 1. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 95–96 (2010). 
 2. The “old originalism,” by contrast, treated the original intentions of the 
Constitution’s drafters as the gauge of the Constitution’s meaning. For accounts of new 
originalism, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 
611 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. 
U.L. REV. 923 (2009); Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
599 (2004). 
 3. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 645 (“Due to either ambiguity or generality, the 
original meaning of the text may not always determine a unique rule of law to be applied 
to a particular case or controversy.”).  
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interpretation alone cannot settle a dispute.4 In that event, the 
need for construction arises.5 The First Amendment is a classic 
example. As Larry Solum observes, that amendment “provides 
for ‘freedom of speech’ and forbids its ‘abridgement,’ but this 
does not create a bright line rule, and as a consequence most of 
the interesting work in free speech doctrine must be done by 
construction rather than interpretation.”6 Many, though not all, 
new originalists accept constitutional construction as a means of 
dealing with constitutional ambiguity and vagueness.7 
 
 4. Old originalists often relied heavily upon the framer’s expected applications to 
resolve questions occasioned by ambiguity or vagueness. See Whittington, supra note 2, 
at 603 (describing the beliefs of old originalists in this regard). New originalists largely 
reject that approach. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 2, at 622–23 (distinguishing between 
“semantic” originalism and “expectations” originalism (citing Ronald Dworkin, 
Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW (Amy Gutman ed., 1997)); Whittington, supra note 2, at 610–11 (asserting 
that the founders’ expectations about how a constitutional provision would be applied do 
not control the determination of that provision’s meaning, for the “founders could be 
wrong about the application and operation of the principles that they intended to 
adopt”). But see John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive 
Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–82 (2007) 
(contending that original expected applications can play an important role in the 
determination of the Constitution’s original public meaning). 
 5. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, & JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999) (“Regardless of the extent 
of judicial interpretation of certain aspects of the Constitution, there will remain an 
impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered. The judiciary may be 
able to delimit textual meaning, hedging in the possibilities, but after all judgments have 
been rendered specifying discoverable meaning, major indeterminacies may remain. The 
specification of a single governing meaning from these possibilities requires an act of 
creativity beyond interpretation . . . . This additional step is the construction of 
meaning.”). Solum contends that insofar as a text’s linguistic and legal meaning 
conceptually differ and construction involves giving a text legal effect, construction 
technically occurs even when a text is precise. Solum, supra note 1, at 102 n.18 and 
accompanying text. Nonetheless, Solum concedes that “[c]onstruction . . . grabs our 
attention in cases in which the linguistic meaning of a text is vague.”). id. at 106.  
 6. Lawrence B. Solum, A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to 
Professor Griffin (June 19, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/abstract=1130665).  
 7. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have been the most vocal dissenters to 
what they describe as “constructionist originalism.” See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case 
against Construction, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 751, 752 (2009). Whether courts—as opposed to 
political actors—can legitimately engage in constitutional construction is a distinct 
question, but also a point of disagreement among originalists. Some—for example, Jack 
Balkin, Randy Barnett and Larry Solum—see constitutional construction as central to 
judicial review. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 
103 NW. U.L. REV. 549 (2009); RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION (2003); Solum, supra note 2. Others see constitutional construction as 
primarily the province of the political branches. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to 
Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2057 (2006) (implicitly 
rejecting judicial construction, at least in any strong form, by arguing that judges should 
defer to the political branches when the Constitution’s meaning is “indeterminate (or 
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The new originalist move toward the interpretation-
construction distinction has opened space for agreement 
between originalists and nonoriginalists. The old originalism was 
not known for an emphasis upon the role of factors such as 
values, purposes and precedent in the exercise of judicial 
review.8 But insofar as constructing constitutional doctrine 
requires consideration of factors other than the text, it invites 
reliance upon some of the interpretive modalities that 
originalism had traditionally been understood to de-emphasize 
or even exclude.9 The existence of this “construction zone”10 has 
prompted some self-proclaimed “living constitutionalists” to 
defect to originalism on the rationale that the two theories are 
not, in fact, polar opposites.11 
Originalism’s embrace of this two-function model of 
constitutional decisionmaking also opens potential common 
ground for originalists and those nonoriginalists who employ a 
similar model. At roughly the same time that some new 
originalists began to focus on the interpretation-construction 
distinction,12 some leading nonoriginalist scholars, spurred by 
 
under-determinate) as to the specific question at hand”); KEITH WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
15 & 16 n.43 (1999) (not denying some role for the judiciary in constructing the 
Constitution, but emphasizing the primary role of the political branches in undertaking 
what he describes as an essentially political activity). 
 8. See Whittingon, supra note 2, at 600–03 (describing the concern of early 
originalists about decisions made according to subjective value choices and their related 
resistance to Warren Court precedent).  
 9. Philip Bobbit identifies six “modalities” of constitutional argumentation: 
historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential. See PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–22 (1991). New originalists do not deny the 
relevance of these modalities even at the point of determining the Constitution’s original 
public meaning. See Whittington, supra note 2, at 611 n.59 (“Certainly originalists would 
be willing to draw inferences based on the constitutional structure, for example, or 
employ arguments based on precedent, though such arguments would ultimately be 
harnessed to some claim about the original meaning of the Constitution.”). Yet insofar as 
the text recedes in importance at the stage of construction, those modalities other than 
original meaning of the text, which are the ones that nonoriginalists tend to emphasize, 
play a larger role. Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 6 (asserting that in the process of 
constitutional construction, “[s]omething external to the text—whether political 
principle, social interest, or partisan consideration—must be alloyed with it in order for 
the text to have a determinate and controlling meaning within a given governing 
context.”). 
 10. This phrase belongs to Larry Solum. Solum, supra note 6, at 6. 
 11. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 7, at 551 (arguing that “original meaning originalism 
and living constitutionalism are not only not at odds, but are actually flip sides of the 
same coin.”); Barnett, supra note 2, at 617–20 (discussing how the new originalism 
accommodates the values of political progressives). 
 12. Keith Whittington is credited with launching discussion of the 
interpretation/construction distinction in the new originalist literature. See 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 5; WHITTINGTON, supra note 7. 
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Richard Fallon’s Foreword in the 1997 Harvard Law Review,13 
began writing about the distinction between interpretation and 
implementation in constitutional law. Fallon pointed out that 
while we talk about the Court engaging in “constitutional 
interpretation,” much constitutional doctrine does not even 
purport to interpret the Constitution’s “meaning.” He argued 
that the Court’s practice in this regard is reflective of the fact 
that, “[i]dentifying the ‘meaning’ of the Constitution is not the 
Court’s only function. A crucial mission of the Court is to 
implement the Constitution successfully. In service of this 
mission, the Court often must craft doctrine that is driven by the 
Constitution, but does not reflect the Constitution’s meaning 
precisely.”14 Others, including Mitch Berman and Kim 
Roosevelt, have followed Fallon’s focus on the Court’s dual 
functions of interpretation and implementation to offer rich 
accounts of how we should understand what the Court does. 15 
Not everyone in the nonoriginalist camp has accepted this “two 
output thesis” about judicial review;16 notably, both Rick Hills 
 
 13. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: 
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, 
Supreme Court]; See also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 
(2001) [hereinafter FALLON, IMPLEMENTING]. Of course, even before the more recent 
discussions about constitutional construction and constitutional implementation, scholars 
had pointed out that constitutional doctrine does not always mirror—or even pretend to 
mirror—what the document itself requires. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme 
Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1975) (distinguishing between judicial decisions actually interpreting the demands of the 
Constitution and the rules of “constitutional common law” that “draw[] their inspiration 
and authority from, but [are] not required by, various constitutional provisions.”); 
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978) (asserting that judicial doctrines often stop 
short of enforcing constitutional norms to their full conceptual limits, and thus cannot be 
said to represent the “meaning” of those norms). This earlier work laid the foundation 
for contemporary theories. 
 14. Fallon, Supreme Court, supra note 13, at 57. Professor Fallon identifies the 
“rational basis” test under the Equal Protection Clause, the “actual malice” standard 
under the First Amendment, and the four-part test for evaluating First Amendment 
protection for commercial advertising as examples of implementing doctrine. FALLON, 
IMPLEMENTING, supra note 13 at 5. 
 15. Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 36 (2004) 
[hereinafter Berman, Rules] (distinguishing between “constitutional meanings” and 
“constitutional rules.”); Kermit Roosevelt, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law 
Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655–58 (2005) (describing the 
“decision rules” model of constitutional law). See also Mitchell N. Berman, 
Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules: Thoughts on the Carving 
of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39, 41 n.3 [hereinafter Berman, 
Constitutional Constructions] (collecting citations to other scholars who have employed 
the interpretation/implementation model). 
 16. The term “two output thesis” belongs to Mitch Berman. See Mitchell Berman, 
Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 202, 220–21 (2006) 
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and Daryl Levinson have rejected it.17 Thus, the interpretation-
construction distinction gives new originalists something in 
common with many nonoriginalists that even the latter’s fellow 
travelers do not share.18 
The papers in this issue, which are the product of a panel 
hosted by the Constitutional Law Section at this year’s annual 
meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, explore 
the implications of the interpretation-construction distinction for 
debates about constitutional theory. They reveal that despite the 
above-described points of convergence between originalism and 
its rivals, debates about originalism are alive and well. In 
particular, the interpretation-construction distinction does not 
eliminate long-running disputes about originalism’s approach to 
interpretation. The new originalist commitment to original 
public meaning privileges semantic meaning over other factors 
and historical over modern understanding.19 As such, this 
approach sometimes yields different results in hard cases than 
nonoriginalist approaches, even those that subscribe to the two-
output thesis. It will sometimes exclude interpretations that a 
nonoriginalist would prefer, and because originalists treat a 
text’s fixed semantic meaning as defining the permissible bounds 
of construction,20 it will sometimes also rule out implementing 
 
(defining the “two output thesis” as “the claim ‘that there exists a conceptual distinction 
between two sorts of judicial work product each of which is integral to the functioning of 
constitutional adjudication,’ namely judge-interpreted constitutional meaning and judge-
crafted tests bearing an instrumental relationship to that meaning”). See also Berman, 
Rules, supra note 15, at 41 (emphasizing that constitutional operative propositions are 
‘logically and perhaps normatively prior to” constitutional decision rules). 
 17. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional 
Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 173, 175 (2006) 
(objecting to the interpretation/implementation construct because “pragmatically 
speaking, the meaning of a constitutional provision is its implementation”); Daryl 
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 
(1999) (challenging a “rights essentialism” that attempts to separate a “pure 
constitutional value” from its “remedial apparatus”). 
 18. For example, despite their many differences, Mitch Berman and Larry Solum 
both insist that a two-output model of constitutional decisionmaking is conceptually 
valuable. See Berman, Constitutional Constructions, supra note 15, at 60–68 (asserting, 
contrary to skeptics like Hills and Levinson, that the two-output thesis is conceptually 
valuable); Solum, supra note 6, at 42 (“[C]ollapsing this distinction [between 
interpretation and construction] can create practical confusion that is every bit as 
pernicious as the theoretical confusion that infects arguments over originalism.”). 
 19. That is not to say that originalists exclude the possibility that other factors, such 
as precedent, may occasionally trump the original public meaning. See, e.g., Solum, supra 
note 2, at 938–39. 
 20. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 647 (asserting that the original public meaning of a 
text, even when ambiguous or vague, “still provides a ‘frame’” that excludes some 
possibilities and permits others). 
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doctrines that taxonomists like Fallon and Berman would 
embrace. The interpretation-construction distinction may have 
broadened the range of factors that originalists will consider in 
constitutional decisionmaking, giving them something in 
common with nonoriginalists, and the two-output thesis may 
have given them something in common with those 
nonoriginalists who identify themselves as taxonomists. But the 
foundational originalist commitment to fixed linguistic meaning 
remains a significant difference between originalism and 
competing theories of constitutional interpretation. 
The articles that follow reflect this disagreement in a lively 
debate about the nature of interpretation and its role in the two-
output thesis. Assuming that one accepts the two-output thesis, 
what should occur at the first stage of constitutional analysis, the 
one that both originalists and taxonomist nonoriginalists devote 
to “interpretation”?21 Is the original semantic meaning of 
constitutional text entitled to significantly more weight than 
other interpretive considerations?22 Does the interpretation-
construction distinction have value for those who reject the 
originalist approach to interpretation?23 If the process of 
interpretation is capacious enough to include considerations 
other than the text’s semantic meaning, is it meaningful to 
separate the development of constitutional law into two steps, or 
should all constitutional decisionmaking be conceptually 
collapsed into the single step of “interpretation”?24 
 
 21. Compare Solum, supra note 1, at 95–96, 100–02  (describing the “interpretation” 
phase of the two-step framework as devoted to the determination of linguistic meaning) 
with Berman,Constitutional Constructions, supra note 15, at 45–46, 60–61 (describing the 
first, “interpretation” phase of the two-step framework as devoted to the determination 
of legal, not simply linguistic, meaning). See also Berman, Constitutional Constructions, 
supra note 15, at 59 (contending that it is “misleading or distracting to assign a particular 
label—and the label ‘interpretation’ at that!—to what is only one among the several 
arguments or considerations that, in appropriate cases, contribute to the Constitution’s 
legal meaning.”). 
 22.  See Ian Bartrum, Constructing the Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic 
Evolution of Federalist 10, at 9, 13–15, 36 (arguing that original semantic meaning is just 
one consideration among the many that determine constitutional meaning); Berman, 
Constitutional Constructions, supra note 15, at 58–60 (denying that “fixed linguistic 
meaning” has “uniquely privileged status.”). 
 23. Berman denies the utility of the originalist approach to the two-output thesis 
while defending the Fallon/Berman/Roosevelt variant of the two-step approach against 
pragmatist challenges. See Berman, Constitutional Constructions, supra note 15, at 60–68. 
Solum argues that separating linguistic from legal effect is conceptually important even 
for those who take a nonoriginalist approach to the determination of linguistic meaning. 
Solum, supra note 1, at 96, 105–18.  
 24. Berman resists a collapse of the interpretation-construction distinction as he 
defines it on the ground that “even if law is determined in ways favored by most theorists 
who lean ‘pragmatic’ or ‘nonoriginalist,’ it is nonetheless of pragmatic value to recognize 
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Because it is the privilege of an Introduction to raise 
questions without answering them, I will conclude by identifying 
some of the questions about the interpretation/construction 
distinction that this symposium provokes for future discussion. 
Perhaps because originalists focus on the document and 
nonoriginalists on the doctrine,25 originalist work on the two-
output thesis has tended to focus heavily on the question of 
interpretation, while nonoriginalists working with the thesis have 
more closely considered the factors that inform the 
implementation stage of constitutional decisionmaking.26  But 
what of judicial construction for the originalist? A key feature of 
nonoriginalist work on implementation is the acceptance of 
doctrines that overenforce the Constitution’s operative 
provisions.27 Does the originalist approach to construction permit 
judicial overenforcement?28 Underenforcement?29 Even apart 
 
that courts build conceptually separate norms, tests, frameworks—in a word, doctrine—
to implement pragmatically determined law.” Berman, Constitutional Constructions, 
supra note 15, at 63. Solum resists a collapse of the interpretation-construction as he 
explains it on the ground that whatever “interpretation” is defined to include, a 
conceptual difference between the determination of semantic and legal meaning remains. 
Solum, supra note 1, at 110, 115–16. 
 25. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 26, 26–27 (2000) (distinguishing between “documentarians,” who emphasize “the 
amended Constitution’s specific words and word patterns, the historical experiences that 
birthed and rebirthed the texts, and the conceptual schemas and structures organizing the 
document,” and “doctrinalists,” who focus less on the text, history, and structure and 
more on “synthesiz[ing] what the Supreme Court has said and done, sometimes rather 
loosely, in the name of the Constitution”). 
 26. Jack Balkin, who places far more emphasis on construction than interpretation, 
is an exception. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 7, at 569–83. I am also focusing here on 
judicial construction. Keith Whittington has offered a rich account of the process of 
political construction of the Constitution. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 7.  
 27. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 15, at 18-50; FALLON, IMPLEMENTING, supra note 
13, at 6; Roosevelt, supra note 15, at 1669–72. 
 28. Originalists insist that constitutional constructions must be consistent with the 
provisions they enforce. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 2, at 647. But because an 
overenforcing doctrine supplements rather than contradicts the relevant constitutional 
provision, an overenforcing doctrine is not necessarily inconsistent with the provision. 
Moreover, there may be room for overenforcement in originalist theory even if 
overenforcing doctrines of judicial review are illegitimate. See Amy Coney Barrett, 
Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 168–77 (2010) (describing 
Justice Scalia’s rejection of overenforcing doctrines of judicial review, but opining that 
even originalists may accept some overenforcement of the Constitution through the use 
of constitutionally based substantive canons of construction). 
 29. Nonoriginalist scholars have given serious attention to the doctrines of judicial 
review that underenforce the Constitution’s operative propositions. See Fallon, Supreme 
Court, supra note 13, at 64–67; Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Judicially Manageable Standards 
and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006); Kermit Roosevelt, 
Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 193 (supporting judicial 
underenforcement but expressing serious reservations about nonjudicial 
underenforcement). See also Sager, supra note 13.  
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from the problem of under and overenforcement, what factors 
should drive the development of implementing doctrines?30 Is 
any deference due the political branches on matters of 
construction, and if so, how much?31 
It is unrealistic to expect originalists to provide a uniform 
answer to any of these questions. But as the papers in this 
symposium illustrate, debate about the interpretation/ 
construction distinction brings new perspectives to age-old 
disputes about judicial review. Whether you ultimately agree or 
disagree with the theory, it is one worth reading about. 
 
 
 30. Originalists have offered some thoughts, but it is a topic on which they disagree 
and on which there is room to say more. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 7, at 773 
n. 79 (noting disagreement among new originalists about the factors that should guide the 
process of constitutional construction). 
 31. As stated above, some originalists conceive of construction as an essentially 
political activity. See supra note 7. But even those originalists who understand 
construction as also a judicial function must decide whether the political branches are 
due some measure of deference with respect to their constitutional constructions, as 
opposed to their constitutional interpretations. Jack Balkin has had the most to say about 
the interaction of political and judicial constructions. See Balkin, supra note 7 at 559–85 
